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Attempts to elucidate the properties of mirror neurons (MNs) have seen considerable effort 
expended and thousands of papers published. Nevertheless, the field is dogged by uncertainty 
and confusion: Not only is it harder than ever to say exactly what a MN is, but there is 
increasing ambiguity about their basic field properties and putative functions. Here we 
challenge the two properties of MNs which have excited most interest; that they ‘mirror’, and 
that they encode goals.  
 
Do mirror neurons ‘mirror’? It is frequently asserted that MNs respond selectively to the 
observation and execution of the same action (e.g., Arnstein et al., 2001; Chong et al., 2008; 
Dinstein et al., 2007, 2008), and thereby ‘mirror’ observed actions in the observer’s motor 
system. For example, MNs are “visuomotor neurons that are active both during the execution 
of a movement and during the observation of the same movement” (Dinstein et al., 2007, 
p.1415). This description is typical, in that it implies that strict sensorimotor congruency - a 
close match between the effective actions during observation and execution - is a defining 
property of MNs. This definition accords with their unfortunate name, and in all likelihood, 
the intuition of many readers.   
 
This intuition is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the definition of MNs used by 
those responsible for their discovery (“[neurons] discharged when the monkey made active 
movements and when it observed specific meaningful actions made by the experimenter. We 
called these neurons mirror neurons”; Gallese et al., 1996, p.595). The practice of treating any 
unit responsive during action observation and execution as a MN, irrespective of sensorimotor 
congruency, continues to be routine in studies of their field properties.  
3 
 
 
So-called ‘strictly congruent MNs’, responsive to the same action during observation and 
execution, account for only 20-30% of MNs (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 
1996). The majority of MNs are at best broadly congruent - responsive during the observation 
and execution of ‘similar’ actions (e.g., to the performance of grasping with the hand, but to 
the sight of grasping with the hand or mouth). These neurons clearly do not mirror the manner 
(i.e., effector, kinematics, trajectory) of action execution. The remaining MNs respond to the 
observation and execution of dissimilar actions (e.g., to the sight of food being placed on a 
surface, but the act of grasping food to eat) and have been termed logically-related MNs. The 
existence of suppression MNs - units that fire during action performance, but are inhibited 
during the observation of similar actions (e.g., Kraskov et al., 2009) – further complicates 
matters. Rather than ‘mirror’ observed actions, such units appear to systematically prevent 
mirroring.  
   
Do mirror neurons encode goals? The view that MNs encode the ‘goals’ of observed actions, 
and thereby contribute to ‘action understanding’, is frequently presented as the prevailing 
consensus of the field (e.g., Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008). The term ‘goal’ is rarely 
defined explicitly but two definitions may be delineated. First, an action goal may refer to the 
object to which it is directed. Accordingly, many authors assert that MNs only respond to 
object-directed actions (e.g., “to be triggered by visual stimuli, mirror neurons require an 
interaction between a biological effector (hand or mouth) and an object”; Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004, p.170). However, sufficient evidence exists to reject this view. As Rizzolatti 
and Craighero indicate, so-called ‘mouth MNs’ have been reported, responsive to the 
observation of lip-smacking and communicative actions performed in the absence of objects 
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(Ferrari et al., 2003). Moreover, examination of the early data reveals that ‘pantomimed’ 
actions (performed without objects) evoked responses in many MNs, albeit more weakly than 
object-directed actions (Gallese et al., 1996). Indeed, a more recent study found that 79% of 
MNs modulated their firing rate in response to pantomimed actions (Kraskov et al., 2009).  
 
The second definition of ‘goal’ is as an effect on the world, or the intention behind an action 
(e.g., ‘to grasp the peanut’ or ‘grasp the peanut to eat’). This suggestion was prompted by the 
observation that MNs “show a large degree of generalization. Presenting widely different 
visual stimuli, but which all represent the same action, is equally effective” (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004, p.170). The excitation of such high-level goal representations, when 
observing actions, is thought to help ‘understand’ those actions. For example, “only those 
[neurons] that can encode the goal of the motor behaviour of another individual with the 
greatest degree of generality can be considered to be crucial for action understanding” 
(Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010, p.269).  
  
Crucially, however, the overwhelming majority of MNs are sensitive to low-level features of 
observed actions that alter their visual appearance but not their goal. For example, Gallese et 
al (1996) reported that the firing of 38% of MNs depended on whether right- or left-hand 
actions were observed, while 64% were sensitive to the direction (i.e., right-to-left or left-to-
right) of the same reaching action. Similarly, MN firing typically depends on whether the 
observer monkey can reach the target object (53% of MNs; Caggiano et al., 2009) and the 
observer monkey’s viewpoint (73% of MNs; Caggiano et al., 2011). If MNs encoded goals, 
whether goals are objects or intentions, their responses should be invariant to these features. 
The goal of an observed movement (e.g., ‘grasp the peanut to eat’) is the same irrespective of 
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which hand is used, the direction of reaching, whether the observer can reach the target-
object, or the observer’s viewpoint. Very few MNs therefore have field properties consistent 
with the goal-coding hypothesis. Indeed, variable MN sensitivity to low-level information 
highlights the need to examine responses at a population level.  
 
Conclusion. The pace with which the MN literature continues to expand is both a blessing and 
curse. Whilst novel datasets promise compelling new insights, there is growing inconsistency 
and tension in the fundamental assumptions, made by different authors, about the defining 
properties of MNs. It is more important than ever that researchers read closely the original 
descriptions of the field properties of MNs, and do not rely on (necessarily) simplified 
accounts presented in review articles. 
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